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Abstract
Dependability is a critical factor in computer 
systems, requiring high quality validation & 
verification procedures in the development stage. At 
the same time, digital devices are getting smaller and 
access to their internal signals and registers is 
increasingly complex, requiring innovative debugging 
methodologies. To address this issue, most recent 
microprocessors include an on-chip debug (OCD) 
infrastructure to facilitate common debugging 
operations. This paper proposes an enhanced OCD 
infrastructure with the objective of supporting the 
verification of fault-tolerant mechanisms through fault 
injection campaigns. This upgraded On-Chip Debug 
and Fault Injection (OCD-FI) infrastructure provides 
an efficient fault injection mechanism with improved 
capabilities and dynamic behavior. Preliminary results 
show that this solution provides flexibility in terms of 
fault triggering and allows high speed real-time fault 
injection in memory elements.  
1. Introduction
Dependability is extremely important in safety 
critical applications. Dependable systems are designed 
to handle errors that originate from software or 
hardware faults and must be able to recover from them 
while maintaining acceptable operating conditions. The 
potentially destructive nature of a failure and the long 
error latencies make it difficult to identify the cause of 
failures in field operation and in the normal time that it 
takes for a failure to occur. Experimentation with a real 
device provides a better study scenario and helps to 
improve its dependability. This experiment-based 
approach requires knowledge of the system 
architecture and behavior and especially of the 
mechanisms implemented to provide tolerance to 
faults, errors or failures, i.e. the events leading to a 
service failure on microprocessor based systems [1]. 
Specific instruments and tools must be used to induce 
hazards and monitor their effects. In the case of 
microprocessor systems, access to internal resources is 
of utmost importance. Many of today’s 
microprocessors support access through dedicated 
built-in debug circuitry, which is often referred as on-
chip debug (OCD). The use of these OCD 
infrastructures for fault injection purposes is an 
efficient solution for verifying and validating fault 
tolerant designs. This paper describes recent research 
on the extension of a fault injection environment in 
order to allow efficient real time fault injection. Two 
techniques were evaluated, one based on a customized 
debugger and the other going a step further and 
proposing the upgrade of the OCD infrastructure itself. 
The next section provides an overview of fault 
injection methodologies used on microprocessor 
systems. Section 3 presents the system used in our case 
study, consisting of a fault injection oriented debugger, 
and also proposes a modification to existing OCD 
infrastructures to enable enhanced fault injection. 
Section 4 presents the experimental results obtained so 
far and section 5 discusses these results and discusses 
future work directions. 
2. Fault Injection in Microprocessors 
Usage of fault-tolerant components is one way to 
achieve dependability. In such cases fault injection can 
be used to: 
? Identify design or implementation faults. 
? Verify & validate and fault tolerance capabilities. 
? Estimate how often failures will occur and evaluate 
the consequences of such failures. 
Fault injection is normally structured in campaigns, 
each campaign comprising a series of experiments 
during which the target system is in operation (a 
specific workload is activated) and a specific fault (or 
set of faults) is inserted at specific trigger conditions. 
The target system behavior is monitored and 
information is recorded as comprehensively as 
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necessary and possible, to understand and evaluate the 
effects of the inserted faults. Existent microprocessor 
fault injection techniques are commonly classified in 
three broad groups, namely (1) simulation based fault 
injection; (2) software based fault injection (SWIFI); 
and (3) physical fault injection. Simulation techniques 
can be used on an early phase of development but are 
often time-consuming and may lack fault coverage as 
they are intrinsically dependant on the quality of the 
model. SWIFI techniques are less expensive but 
require modifications to the running code (which in 
fact modifies the target system) and faults can only be 
inserted in those resources that are accessible by 
software. Physical fault injection usually allows a 
better representation of real world faults but it is 
usually more expensive and less controllable.  
The hardest part of microprocessor fault injection is 
how to access those internal elements where faults are 
more probable, generally the memory elements and 
communication buses, without disturbing any running 
applications. OCD infrastructures provide access to 
internal resources in parallel with the target hardware 
and running software, being an excellent mechanism 
for modifying register and / or memory values (i.e. 
insert faults) and subsequently retrieve the data 
necessary for result analysis. The non-intrusive nature 
of this form of fault injection is in itself an added-
value, as it requires no modification to the target 
system. Most fault injection techniques that use OCD 
rely on halting the processor, either by the use of 
external control signals or via breakpoints, and 
subsequently modifying the target registers or memory 
locations to emulate a fault. The usual approach 
involves a host machine running the fault injection 
campaign and a debugger accessing the target 
infrastructure. As a technological solution, the major 
problem with OCD is the lack of a consistent set of 
capabilities and of a standard communications interface 
across processor architectures.
An industry consortium has been working on the 
establishment of a standard for OCD, which is formally 
designated “IEEE-ISTO 5001, The Nexus 5001 Forum 
Standard for a Global Embedded Processor Debug 
Interface” [2]. If widely adopted, it will be possible to 
use the same debugger to access the core of multiple 
processors and to use a similar set of debugging 
features with all of them. This standard is still in a 
proposal phase, but it represents an interesting 
possibility for the development of common fault 
injection methodologies addressing the verification & 
validation of dependable microprocessor based 
systems.  
Experimental work has been done in our research 
group and in the DISCA-UPV [3] using real-time fault 
injection on a MPC565 based system, which is the 
most widely used NEXUS compliant microprocessor. 
The results obtained confirmed our expectations and 
enabled the identification of some shortcomings 
concerning fault triggering and performance issues. 
Our experiments confirmed that it is possible to insert 
faults in the memory space on-the-fly and then use the 
trace information gathered as an effective means to 
analyze program flow, before and after fault activation.  
However, two problems arose from these 
experiments, which are important for all real time fault 
injection devices. As most NEXUS compliant 
debuggers [4] [5] communicate with the host PC 
through Ethernet or USB connections, this 
communications channel imposes a bottleneck on the 
time required for memory access. The time required to 
read the contents of a memory cell and to write back a 
modified value is in the order of milliseconds. This 
delay allows the initial data to be overwritten by the 
application running on the target system, the magnitude 
of the problem depending of the running application 
and memory position targeted. In the case of small 
applications or frequently used memory cells, it 
becomes impossible to insert the desired type of fault 
without halting program execution. The second 
problem consists of the triggering of a fault. The 
required information is not readily available (even 
when using watchpoints or reading trace data without 
halting the processor), as it must reach the host 
machine before it can be acted upon. This additional 
delay effectively prevents its use for fault triggering, 
limiting the available options to time-based 
approaches.
This last problem can be solved by adding reactive 
behavior to the debugger, to enable it to perform a 
write operation upon the detection of a specific signal 
or message from the target system. The insertion of a 
specific fault on a memory cell used by a running 
application is mainly a performance problem. Reducing 
the writing delay of the fault injection process 
minimizes the probability of the cell being accessed by 
the target in the meantime. 
3. Case Study 
3.1 Target System 
The use of a NEXUS compliant device benefits 
from the useful debugging features defined in the 
standard and increases the domain of immediate 
applicability of the proposed solutions. As neither the 
current commercial NEXUS debuggers nor the 
compatible CPUs are easily modifiable, an alternative 
microprocessor core where a NEXUS compliant OCD 
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infrastructure could be implemented was selected. A 
customized debugger was also necessary, as available 
devices require specific libraries for each target. The 
OCD and the debugger were developed in the form of 
VHDL modules, to ensure portability and to maintain a 
high level of compatibility with different target 
architectures. In this way a complete proof-of-concept 
solution was tested and the requirements for its 
migration to existent systems (or to those under 
development) were evaluated.   
The cpugenerator [6] building tool was selected to 
create the microprocessor targets. This tool is publicly 
available through opencores [7] and allows the 
automatic creation of 4, 8, 16 or 32 bit RISC 
microprocessor cores, enabling the configuration of 
several parameters such as bus type, interrupt support 
features and memory configuration.  
The OCD version implemented on the target system 
is NEXUS Class-2+ compliant (all Class 2 plus some 
Class 3 features) and includes some customization 
capabilities to make it compatible with different CPU 
configurations, requiring only minor adjustments. The 
target application for testing is a matrix_addFT
program, which is a fault tolerant version of a matrix 
adder. Fault tolerance is achieved by duplicating each 
arithmetic operation and then comparing the obtained 
results; any difference will trigger an error detection 
routine. Although not as powerful as hardware fault 
tolerance, this solution enables some degree of 
dependability without requiring modifications to the 
hardware, at the cost of memory space and 
performance penalty.  
The NEXUS standard defines a minimum set of 
debugging features, the interface port and the 
communication protocol. The implemented features 
include all common OCD features plus real time access 
to memory. The interface with the outside world is 
made using the AUX port option, which provides two 
message data buses for OCD data input and output 
along with independent clock and control signals. Two 
additional event pins allow halting the processor and 
exact timing for watchpoint / breakpoint signaling.  
The communication protocol was implemented as 
defined in the standard, with all mandatory messages 
being implemented and two optional messages added 
for internal register access and OCD configuration. The 
OCD infrastructure is divided in three main modules 
and two bus access modules as represented in Figure 1. 
The thinner arrows represent control and status signals 
and the thicker arrows represent the flow of data and 
trace information. The FI module represented is not 
included in the original OCD and is used to build the 
OCD-FI version explained further ahead on this paper. 
Figure 1 – The OCD Infrastructure 
The MQM (Message Queuing and Management) 
module implements the NEXUS message handler and 
the OCD controller. It translates all debugging 
operations into messages and vice versa, manages the 
message queues and provides the necessary control 
signals to the other modules. The message queues are 
implemented using FIFO (First-In First-Out) memory 
blocks and in the case of an overflow, an error message 
is sent from the MQM module to the debugger, via the 
NEXUS port.
The RCT (Run Control & Trace) module receives 
commands from both the MQM and RWA modules 
and outputs trace data and watchpoint hit signals. It 
also controls the CPU core clock and the signals 
required to identify branch and exception occurrences 
on the running application. It is possible to use up to 
two instruction and one data breakpoint and both types 
can be activated at the Nth occurrence of their trigger 
condition. Additionally a watchpoint may be generated 
in the same manner as either type of breakpoint. The 
RCT is linked to the Bus Snooper which is used to 
monitor data and instruction bus activity, to allow 
program trace and breakpoint / watchpoint generation. 
Program trace is performed using branch trace 
messaging as defined in the NEXUS standard, 
accounting for executed instructions and signaling 
branch and exception occurrences.
The RWA (Read & Write Access) module is used to 
access both the OCD registers and the CPU resources 
(memory and registers).  A register (RAW_REG) is 
used to store the data and address of the next read / 
write operation, as this information takes several clock 
cycles to be transmitted by the MQM module. Conflicts 
in RAM access are handled by the bus master with the 
OCD taking priority on access by default. As inputs 
and outputs are handled by the processor as directly 
mapped addresses it is possible to access those 
resources in the same manner as they would be 
accessed by the microprocessor. 
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3.2 Fault Injection Environment 
In the case of microprocessor systems with built-in 
debugging mechanisms two areas where the fault 
injection capabilities can be improved are the debugger 
and the OCD itself. In an effort to be as comprehensive 
as possible, experiments were conducted on both areas 
and the results compared. The selected fault model is 
used in most common fault scenarios for 
microprocessor based critical systems [8] and consists 
of single bit-flip faults in random memory elements, 
occurring at random moments during the application 
execution. The fault trigger can be any instruction 
occurrence of the application currently running, 
covering the entire execution time. The fault location 
can be any resource accessible via the OCD, including 
memory, internal registers and stack. All experiments 
are structured into fault injection campaigns, and each 
of them defines a set of fault injection operations where 
a specific fault location and trigger are selected. In each 
of such operations the processor is reset and the 
application runs from start. Each campaign is generated 
by an external tool and then described as a script that 
includes the necessary messages to be sent to the OCD 
infrastructure, both for configuration and data 
collection. The initialization phase loads the 
application into memory and sets up the OCD 
infrastructure as required by the specific operation. The 
target memory value at the moment of the injection 
must be determined beforehand, using either the 
knowledge of the running application code or a prior 
fault-free execution up to the fault triggering instant, 
and then using the OCD to read the relevant memory 
cell contents. In this manner it is possible to determine 
the value that should be stored, so that a single bit-flip 
is caused on the target with a single write operation.  
The fault injection campaigns can be used for 
experimental evaluation of the target device fault 
tolerant characteristics and preliminary results were 
analyzed to evaluate the fault injection procedure itself. 
The normal fault injection scenario consists of the 
NEXUS compliant target microprocessor, a host 
machine running the fault injection campaigns and a 
debugger connecting both. This scenario is represented 
on Figure 2, where boxes #1 and #2 may represent 
simulation modules, physical devices or parts of the 
same FPGA. 
Figure 2 – Fault Injection Scenario 
Each fault injection operation consists of loading the 
input memory bank with a series of instructions 
describing the steps required for its execution. These 
include the necessary OCD set-up and application 
loading steps. After these are completed the debugger 
waits for the triggering condition to be met which will 
be signaled by a watchpoint hit signal. Although the 
debugger allows an instant reaction to this signal, the 
actual fault insertion still requires the transmission and 
decoding (by the OCD) of at least one complete 
message. During the entire operation the output 
memory records the trace messages that are sent by the 
OCD, to enable the reconstruction of program flow and 
fault effect analysis. After the application runs the 
OCD may be used to check if all final results are 
correct. All steps can be done with the target processor 
running normally, but the fault activation may only 
take place after this set up is performed. The program 
trace is not affected and operates normally before, 
during, and after the fault injection process, reacting 
exactly as if a “real” fault was inserted. 
3.3 FI Module 
The On-Chip Debug and Fault Injection (OCD-FI) 
concept proposed on this paper consists of an 
additional hardware module that automatically inserts 
faults on the occurrence of a triggering condition, 
without further commands from the debugger. This 
Fault Injection (FI) module is represented in Figure 3 
and is implemented within the OCD circuitry reusing 
some of the debugging functions that are already 
implemented. 
Figure 3 – Fault Injection Module 
Two requisites have to be met by the OCD 
infrastructure to enable the usage of this module, 
namely: 
? Write operations must be executed on the activation 
of a specific control signal that can be controlled by 
the FI module. This may be performed by pre-
loading one or more registers prior to the write 
operation itself.  
? The OCD must signal watchpoint occurrences and 
this signal must be available to the FI module. 
Alternatively, a breakpoint signal may be used, but 
for real time operation the actual halting of the 
execution must be inhibited. 
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Depending on the actual OCD architecture, some 
additional logic may be necessary for signal 
multiplexing and status control. Once enabled the FI 
module monitors the watchpoint or breakpoint signal, 
so that it can activate a fault injection action. The input 
signals FI_SEL and FI_VAL are used to access the 
FI_EN register, which enables and configures the FI 
module. The TRIGGER input prompts the execution of 
the FI operation. The output signal (FI_EXEC) is used 
to activate a memory write operation in order to insert a 
single bit-flip fault at a given address. This approach 
requires that both the data value to be written and the 
respective memory address that were previously 
determined be preloaded in the OCD register 
(RAW_REG) that is used for data writing. The required 
data must be downloaded to the OCD infrastructure 
prior to the watchpoint occurrence, and the RAW_REG
register must not be rewritten until the actual fault 
activation. Once the fault is inserted, the FI module 
disables itself and all the OCD resources can then be 
used normally. Two dedicated (optional) NEXUS 
messages are used, one to enable and configure the FI 
module and the other one to set up the address and data 
values for the actual fault injection. Fault triggering can 
be done using either a breakpoint or a watchpoint. The 
watchpoint option allows the injection of faults without 
stopping the target system but can only be used for 
memory, as access to internal register requires the 
system to be halted. For the insertion of faults in 
internal registers or the stack it is necessary to add a 
breakpoint with the same address as the watchpoint, to 
ensure that the processor is halted when fault injection 
takes place. In this case, the signal used for fault 
activation can also be used to restart program 
execution, as represented in Figure 3 in the form of a 
dotted line. In this case the OCD-FI infrastructure 
allows the insertion of faults in all resources mapped in 
the OCD, with a minimum time delay. The FI module 
can also be programmed prior to the application start or 
in runtime, the only limiting factor being the fault 
activation instant. 
4. Experimental Results 
Three CPU configurations were used differing only 
in terms of bus width, all including full interrupt 
support and internal stack. All configurations include 
separate ROM and RAM banks on the target system, 
the first for storing the program code and the later for 
application data. The fault campaigns were structured 
as follows: 
? For the sake of simplicity, fault campaigns are 
divided between those where activating the fault 
injection can be done with the processor running 
and those where it must be done during set up. 
? The instruction address that triggers each fault 
injection is randomly generated from the accessed 
ROM space and each target memory position is also 
randomly selected from the used RAM space. 
? The OCD is configured once at the beginning of the 
campaign, which is then loaded into memory and 
the experiments executed sequentially. 
? The results are retrieved after all the experiments 
are complete, their analysis being performed 
externally to check if the final results are correct 
and if the fault was detected. 
Each set of fault campaigns was executed on each of 
the configurations and repeated using both the original 
OCD and the OCD-FI infrastructure. After simulating 
several fault campaigns the following conclusions, 
relative to the fault injection processes, were reached: 
? The OCD-FI infrastructure does not degrade the 
maximum microprocessor clock frequency, and it is 
possible to use the same frequency for all clocks. 
? Each infrastructure requires a minimum number of 
clock cycles for system set up prior to each fault 
injection operation and for the writing operation 
itself, as represented in Table 1. Set up time 
assumes that all configuration registers are already 
set up (prior to the fault injection) and writing time 
is measured from the watchpoint hit to the writing 
instant of the intended value into memory. 
Table 1 – Fault Injection Delay (in CLK cycles) 
 OCD OCD-FI 
CPU Set up Writing Set up Writing 
8 bit 13 14 28 2 
16 bit 14 18 32 2 
32 bit 14 21 36 2 
? If targeting internal microprocessor registers, 
execution must be halted for only 2 additional clock 
cycles if using the OCD-FI infrastructure, which 
increases slightly the time interval required to run 
each fault campaign. 
? If using only the OCD for register access, the time 
interval during which the processor must be halted 
is 2 clock cycles higher that the time required for 
memory writing. 
? When using only the OCD some experiments return 
meaningless results because the CPU writes on the 
memory cell being targeted before the fault is 
inserted. This did not happen with the OCD-FI. 
The number of equivalent gates for each module and 
each CPU configuration is presented in Table 2. The 
number of gates required for the Bus Snooper and the 
Bus Master modules are included in the RCT and 
RWA counts, respectively. 
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Table 2 – Area Overhead 
8 bit CPU 16 bit CPU 32 bit CPU Modules # Gates % # Gates % # Gates % 
CPU core 9166 N/A 20212 N/A 53717 N/A
RCT 2391 34 3730 31 5113 27 
RWA 369 5 516 4 643 3 
MQM 4225 60 7715 65 13045 69 
FI 75 1,1 75 0,6 75 0,4 
OCD-FI 7060 100 11961 100 18876 100
Debugger 766 N/A 817 N/A 1079 N/A 
Synthesis results confirm that the logic overhead of 
the FI module is minimal. It is also possible to see that 
a simple NEXUS compliant debugger loaded only with 
fault injection campaigns management and results 
storage requires comparatively little space on a 
programmable device. The area of the OCD itself is 
comparatively large, as the implemented CPU cores are 
rather simple in terms of registers and instruction 
support. This effect is less notorious as the CPUs 
increase in complexity, because the OCD area mostly 
depends on the size and complexity of the 
communication buses. 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
From the available results it is possible to conclude 
that the proposed OCD-FI infrastructure is an efficient 
mechanism for verifying and validating the fault 
tolerance characteristics of microprocessor based 
systems. The implementation of a fault injection 
oriented debugger allows the inclusion of some 
features that are lacking in the majority of commercial 
devices, as they are not required for most debug 
operations. The FI module main advantage is its 
extremely fast reaction time. When compared with 
other alternatives, it provides an efficient methodology 
for fault injection, both in terms of reusability, resource 
coverage, performance and cost. If the necessary HDL 
modules are available, the OCD-FI can be used for 
fault injection in the simulation phase, prototyping 
phase or in the final device. Faults can be inserted on 
most CPU resources with a minimum delay, allowing 
non-intrusive and fast fault injection campaigns. The 
achieved performance is better when targeting memory 
space and when the faults are not injected early in the 
application execution. In this case, fault campaigns can 
be executed almost as fast as it takes to run the target 
application and without stopping it. Even in less than 
ideal circumstances, either by targeting microprocessor 
registers or injecting early faults in memory, it is a very 
efficient mean to execute fault injection campaigns. 
The compliance with the NEXUS proposed standard 
provides a common basis for development and 
enhancement of the proposed methodology. In this 
sense, the OCD-FI concept can easily be extended to 
any NEXUS compliant microprocessor and even other 
architectures as the more complex functions are 
performed by the OCD infrastructure. As this is already 
required for debug purposes, the added FI module 
provides considerable advantages with a very low logic 
overhead. It should be easy to add to most devices, and 
with eventual modifications it is a lightweight solution 
for most microprocessor architectures. As an added 
feature, the debugger may be included into the same 
programmable device as the target system, therefore 
ensuring best performance and reducing the necessary 
resources and associated costs, the only limitation 
being the availability of memory for data storage. As a 
downside, an adequate OCD infrastructure is needed 
and both the OCD and the target CPU must be 
available in the form of an HDL model. If injecting 
faults on a physical device, an external debugger is also 
required along with an adequate communications 
channel. The ongoing work addresses the applicability 
of this fault injection approach to different scenarios 
and fault tolerant architectures.  Different target 
systems are also being considered, the LEON [9] being 
a good prospective target due to its possible use in 
space missions, where dependability is of utmost 
importance. 
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